A surprising connection on the professional network. An offer of work from a headhunter, most likely a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The opportunity to earn perhaps £20,000 on the side writing a small number of geopolitical analyses for a firm from China peppered with “non-public” or “insider” information. Compensation in cryptocurrency or cash favored.
It might appear clear, in this scenario, that an element about this approach would be amiss. Nevertheless, Beijing's influential intelligence agency still considers it valuable to deploy headhunters to attempt this – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum stated Chinese agents were approaching Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented scale, at a frequency of ten thousand over the previous two and a half years, seeking political, commercial, military and technological secrets. However a fresh initiative targeting elected officials and parliament has prompted the intelligence service to act again.
An espionage alert was distributed on this week via the administrative teams of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, research organizations – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legislative Changes
In the curious manner of UK security services, there was no publication of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. But the service was aware its advisory document would become public once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press helps the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a fraudulent intent.
This warning has the effect of flushing out additional details from within parliament, though that is not the agency's primary purpose. The service aims for people in public life to understand that just because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are completely safe.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, though the recent actions does come after the awkward failure of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of spying for China – a allegation they rejected – but inability to complete a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in warnings that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Updated Laws and Beijing's Strategic Interests
Legislation has now been changed, and the MI5 slide includes a reminder of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk significant legal consequences under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if a person engages in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is particularly focused in parliament: for a time, in recent years, the UK’s China policy on matters such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Methodological Differences and Persistent Cyber Threats
To a degree there are distinct approaches as well. Autocratic regimes like China’s utilize information gathering techniques and the scale of its spy network is enormous, engaging 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than Western agencies have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate people over the extended period and at times even the agencies have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and spying. “China has a low threshold for which details is considered to be of value,” security minister Dan Jarvis told MPs on this week, but a rapid shift in the government situation may mean someone quickly marginal becomes significant.
Another way to think about the continuous efforts at secret intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between China and the west at a level under the level of outright war. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of phone and data networks in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon breach of millions connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is involved in relentless efforts to find covert sources on British democracy online because it seeks to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.
